



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 17

The Nixon Mission to Africa

by Vernon McKay

Vice President Richard M. Nixon's March visit to eight African capitals is perhaps the most important event since World War II to alert the peoples of Africa and of the United States to their growing mutuality of interests. A vice-presidential mission commands special attention both at home and abroad, and it will be long remembered by the hundreds of thousands of cheering Africans who greeted their American visitors. Here at home it will strengthen the efforts of the small but steadily increasing number of persons, both in and out of government, who have struggled for years to gain for Africa the attention it deserves at the highest policy-making levels, including the National Security Council.

In perspective the trip itself is more significant than the Nixon policy recommendations for Africa, made public by the White House on April 6. The Vice President's conclusions and suggestions are nonetheless important. Viewed as a whole, they are commendably constructive. Mr. Nixon's major conclusions are in line with the reports of two congressional leaders who have recently visited Africa—Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton, Republican of Ohio, in 1955, and Senator Theodore

F. Green, Democrat of Rhode Island, in 1956—and his views do not conflict with the three major pronouncements on Africa made by Assistant Secretaries of State in 1950, 1953 and 1956.

On the basically important colonial question, the Vice President repeats, with slight but unimportant changes, the moderate formula elaborated by the Department of State in its first major statement on Africa on May 8, 1950. "The United States," Mr. Nixon writes, "stands for the evolution of dependent peoples toward self-government and independence, as they become able to discharge the responsibilities involved." No mention is made of such controversial subjects as the establishment of final time limits for the independence of African territories, or even of intermediate target dates for specific political advances to prepare the way for self-government—an idea advocated by the United States delegation in the United Nations Trusteeship Council.

Major emphasis is given to the need to expand and improve the size and quality of government agencies and personnel dealings with Africa, including a separate Bureau of African Affairs in the Department of State "which will

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place this continent on the same footing as the other great area groupings of the world." The Vice President calls for more and better caliber Foreign Service officers in African posts, more travel money to enable them to study their areas, and stronger economic sections in our embassies in order to attract private investment. He asks for substantially increased funds for the United States Information Agency (USIA) libraries and reading rooms overseas, and for the exchange of persons program.

The Vice President is somewhat equivocal in his support for our economic aid and technical assistance programs, possibly because he has an eye on the budget-cutting mood of Congress. Whatever his reason, this lends an air of unreality to his appeal for private capital to develop Africa. As the President's International Development Advisory Board has indicated, private enterprise is seldom interested unless such essential services as roads, power and housing are provided through public financing.

Other points worth noting include Nixon's admirably frank statement that we cannot talk equality to the people of Africa without putting an end to racial discrimination at home; his strong appeal for "the greatest possible interchange of persons and ideas" with African leaders and peoples; and his emphasis on the importance of developing friendly relations with the African free trade-union movement. Conspicuous by its absence was any mention of the United Nations, despite the fact that our most difficult African problems are

often those on which we have to take positions in the UN.

Addressing Two Audiences

The most regrettable aspect of the Vice President's report stems from the fact that he is writing for two audiences—one in the United States and the other in Africa. Many of the ideas and phrases which may help to win public support and congressional appropriations at home are likely to be unconvincing, if not offensive, in Africa, where the USIA is widely publicizing the full text of the report. This is a mistake we can ill afford. For example, Mr. Nixon writes of the "battle for men's minds." Africans may be inclined to respond that they have minds of their own, which they have no intention whatever of losing to either the United States or the Soviet Union.

Another unfortunate sentence is worth quoting in full because it illustrates an attitude that Americans must learn to overcome if they expect to win friends in Africa: "To the extent that the Africans become familiar with the culture and technology, the ideals and aspirations and the traditions and institutions which combine to make up the American character, we shall have made great advances in common understanding." This attitude borders on the paternalism of the colonial relationship and will arouse mingled feelings of irritation and amusement among educated Africans. What we need most is the exact opposite. We cannot make "great advances in common understanding" unless Americans learn to

understand and appreciate the complex cultures and traditions and institutions of Africa.

The language in which the Vice President describes the Communist threat in his report will also make better reading in the United States than in Africa. While Mr. Nixon acknowledges that Communist domination is not a present danger, he calls Africa a "priority" target for Communists, who are "desperately" trying to win African support and are "without question putting their top men in the fields of diplomacy, intrigue and subversion into the African area." To Africans these words will seem badly out of focus, if not inaccurate. More important, the stress on the Communist threat tends to emphasize the undesirable idea that we are interested in Africa not for its own sake but because we are going all out to win the "battle for men's minds." Our success in winning African friendship may vary in direct proportion to our ability to develop a more relaxed attitude—not an attitude of negligence, but a calculated relaxation which respects the rights of Africans to make up their own minds.

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How Will Britain's New Defense Policy Affect U.S.?

There have been White Papers and White Papers since the war and before—but few if any, whether put out on this side of the Atlantic or the other, carry the impact and implications of Britain's latest: the one on defense policy, issued on April 4.

President Eisenhower, in referring to Britain's new defense planning, spoke of that country's "courage and nerve" in facing up to the realities of the atomic and ballistic-missile age. And there is no question that it took "courage and nerve" for Britain to take this step. As Eisenhower said, Britain is now cutting its "cloth" to what it has, "not to what [it] would like to have." Incidentally, the President coined a mixed metaphor in the process that is sure to go down in future grammars: Britain "has had a really heroic row to hoe in trying to keep its economic nose above water."

Old System a Luxury

In a sense Britain has jumped the gun. It switched defense policy to an atomic-missile era before that era had actually arrived. We are on the threshold of that era. There is no question but that it is coming. But one must admit that even the United States does not yet have those missiles which justify the new British defense posture. However, Britain's shift was an announcement of policy, not an announcement of present capabilities. What Britain did was to read the handwriting on the wall and move to adjust itself to the inevitable.

It is perhaps true that Britain was forced—or pushed—into this dramatic new defense policy by the stark fact that Britain could no longer afford the luxury of the old defense system. But in making the shift Brit-

ain publicly admitted two other facts that cannot be easy or pleasant for any power to have to admit: First, its security now rests on the power and superiority of another nation's strategic air force; and second, containment of the Soviet Union through conventional arms and armies is now Washington's job—not London's. Pax Britannica has been replaced by Pax Americana—and London publicly admits it.

The advantage of this shift in British defense policy is that it may strengthen Britain's economy and the pound sterling. This was what President Eisenhower was hinting at in his comments on the British action. Henceforth, Britain's major contribution to free-world strength will be in the economic field—keeping its currency strong, its trade expanding and the sterling area united. This is not to discount the missile contribution which Britain will make to NATO strength, or the vital importance of British bases and Commonwealth co-operation. What the new program does, however, is recognize and accept the premise that free-world strength and security depend as much on economic well-being as on military capabilities—and Britain's job is to concentrate on the first.

'Great Debate' for U.S.

Although Britain may be aware of the new missile era which the world is entering, there is no comparable sign of such awareness in the United States—except possibly by some of the top brass and some top officials. There is certainly no sign yet in Washington that the government as a whole, and as spokesman for the nation, is awake to the implications

of Britain's move. If so, there would be an end to the constant argument and bickering here over defense costs, budget estimates and military aid. There would be a major review and revision of American defense policies. Such a major shift in military strategy by America's principal ally cannot but force major shifts in United States policy. But those shifts in American policy have yet to emerge. It will be a miracle if the United States can now avoid a great debate, unparalleled in this century, on whether to go along with the British concept of missile-age defense or revert to a "Fortress America" premise for United States security.

The British move will also have a significant impact on our NATO partners. If Britain can trim its defense costs and global military responsibilities, then why not France, Italy, West Germany, the Benelux countries? If America must throw its strategic air umbrella over Britain, why not over these other allies as well? There are all kinds of questions as to American defense policy which need restudy and new answers in the light of the British White Paper. Usually the United States cannot make a shift in military posture without upsetting the defense plans of all its allies; but in this case it is the British who, by their fundamentally new approach to their own security problems, are touching off far-reaching repercussions in other countries.

One thing is certain. The U.S.S.R. does not like this new trend in Western military strategy. Its threats, warnings and denunciations of practically every free-world nation, lest

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Should U.S. Have Helped Hungary More?

by Paul E. Zinner

Dr. Zinner, assistant professor of government at Columbia University, worked with the Office of Strategic Services during World War II and afterward with the Department of State until 1951. He is the editor of *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1956).

(Once more Hungary is in the news. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who had put forward the doctrine of liberation for the satellites in the 1952 Presidential campaign, urged peaceful liberation of captive peoples at the annual Associated Press luncheon in New York on April 22. And Endre Marton, former Associated Press resident correspondent in Hungary declared on the same day that broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, particularly the latter, had led Hungary's anti-Communist rebels "to expect something—and nothing has happened." As a result, he said, the average Hungarian feels "let down.")

Here are two views on what the United States could and should have done at the time of the Hungarian revolt.—The Editor)

THE heroic rising of the Hungarian nation to rid itself of the shackles of Communist tyranny and its tragic aftermath have evoked uncommonly profound emotional responses in the Western world.

The full measure of the lasting implications of the Hungarian events remains to be assessed. At the moment there are widely divergent, even diametrically opposed, interpretations. They range from the opinion held by Milovan Djilas, former vice-president of Yugoslavia, that Soviet intervention in Hungary is the signal for the final disintegration of communism (although this does not alleviate the immediate plight of the Hungarians) to the dour evaluation of the performance of American diplomacy by observers like Professor

Hans Morgenthau of the University of Chicago in his articles in *The New Republic* of December 10 and 17. Dr. Morgenthau regards our actions in the Hungarian crisis as little short of unmitigated disaster, marking an unhealthy departure from previous basic assumptions and general practices and representing a turning point for the worse in our foreign policy.

It is not necessary to take the darkest view of our policy in the Hungarian crisis in order to share a real sense of uneasiness and dissatisfaction about the possibility that the United States, in this case, defaulted on a moral obligation and/or ill served the power interests of the free world. For whatever reason—there is no real dichotomy between moral and power considerations, although one is usually emphasized to the detriment of the other—there is a widespread feeling that more should have been done for Hungary to stave off Soviet intervention. The question is, What?

Tests of Action

The efficacy of any proposed course of action must be tested with reference to (1) its feasibility in terms of the basic premises guiding American foreign policy and the immediate, special circumstances prevailing at the time; and (2) the probable reaction of the Soviet leadership. To suggest desirable objectives without keeping in mind the realities of the situation, and accounting for imponderables as best as possible, would be worse than useless.

Moral suasion and political pressure, especially through the United

Nations, have been mentioned as approaches which the United States could have explored more forcefully. Perhaps this is so. The question is, To what avail? It is highly doubtful whether either moral suasion or political pressure would have accomplished its avowed purpose even if we recognize that the Soviet leaders were initially disoriented with regard to the Hungarian revolt and were not of one mind on how to handle it.

It is particularly difficult to see how the UN could have inserted itself into the picture at a time and in a manner calculated to sway the will of the Soviet leaders. Any action by the UN before November 1, when Premier Imre Nagy first appealed to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld "to put on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly the question of Hungary's neutrality and the defense of this neutrality by the four great powers," would have been inconceivable.

By November 1 and 2, however, when Nagy made his second and stronger appeal to have the Security Council direct the Soviet and Hungarian governments to enter into negotiations concerning the withdrawal of Russian armed forces stationed in Hungary, in accordance with the Warsaw treaty, the UN had to deal with the Middle Eastern crisis, which overshadowed events in Hungary. The Security Council was paralyzed by the big-power veto, as it always is in vital matters. To muster sufficient support in the General Assembly for any kind of resolution

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by Christopher Emmet

Mr. Emmet, chairman, American Friends of the Captive Nations, is also chairman of Foreign Affairs Round Table of Station WEVD, and New York correspondent of *Die Zeit*, Hamburg. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

THE re-enslavement of the Hungarian people after their incredible but fleeting victory has posed the agonizing question for the West, "Could we have done more?" This question concerns not only the past but the future, for there may be other Hungarys. It is generally conceded that because of Hungary's geographical and military position, substantial military help to that country would have involved the threat of global war. But there were opportunities for measures short of war.

What were the missed opportunities? There was indecision among the leaders of the Kremlin before they undertook renewed military action against Hungary on November 4. This is indicated by the shifting announcements of Soviet policy, including the offer at one point to withdraw Soviet troops; by the series of separate visits of high Soviet officials to Budapest; and by the reports of Hungarian refugees, including Mayor Joseph Koevago of Budapest, as well as Yugoslav diplomats. The mayor has described the amicable negotiations between Anastas Mikoyan and Zoltan Tildy of the Nagy cabinet, looking toward the friendly neutralization of Hungary.

This Soviet indecision flowed from the fact that, given the political costs and risks of suppressing the Hungarian revolution, it might have been a lesser evil to permit the neutralization of Hungary, like that of Austria, provided the United States cooperated in saving Moscow's face, as the President did in his talk on October 31, and provided safeguards were offered to insure Hungary's *real* mili-

tary neutralization, such as the Eden plan, local application of the President's "open skies" proposal, and so on. If this is true, then United States and UN pressure short of force or threat of force might have made the difference in the Soviet decision, by increasing the political, psychological and economic cost of Moscow's second Soviet intervention in Hungary on November 4.

The Missed Opportunities

It was already clear that renewed Soviet military intervention in Hungary would be immensely costly in terms of Soviet influence, especially in the uncommitted nations, and in terms of Communist unity and discipline throughout the world. The presence of United Nations observers in Hungary before the second intervention would have immensely increased these costs. The imposition of UN sanctions until the Soviet armies withdrew from Hungary would have frozen these losses.

The United States, therefore, could have gained great bargaining power with the Soviet government by pressing for the appointment of UN observers while the frontier was still open and by threatening to impose sanctions, which might have been adopted by the NATO countries *even if the proposal had been defeated in the UN*. In either case sanctions would have restored and sharpened the cold war, thus wrecking the principal Soviet objective since Stalin's death—to replace the cold war with "peaceful coexistence" in order to weaken NATO and encourage the outbreak of old quarrels among the

Western nations, from Algeria to Suez.

By attempting to tie in the Suez crisis with the Hungarian crisis in UN debates, resolutions and behind-the-scenes bargaining for votes, the United States might have reduced the diversionary effect of the Suez dispute, which prevented more vigorous political action in Hungary, and increased the chance of winning UN support for the threat of sanctions against the Soviet Union.

In gauging how much the presence of UN observers and/or the threat of sanctions would have increased United States bargaining power, it must be remembered that the Kremlin was not only worried by the political cost of a second military intervention in Hungary; it was worried that uprisings and general strikes might break out in East Germany and in Poland, which was then in a state of incipient revolution. There was evidence of unrest all the way from East Germany to Vietnam. Also, the attitude of Soviet troops during the first fighting in Hungary showed that not only the satellite armies but some of the Soviet soldiers as well were unreliable.

Simultaneous revolts or general strikes in Poland and East Germany, while the Hungarian revolution was in progress, might have been impossible for the Soviets to control and might have had a chain reaction in other satellites and within the U.S.S.R. itself. While making it clear that we did not intend to intervene militarily, the United States could have threatened to encourage other uprisings in Eastern Europe instead of discouraging them with every means in our power, as we did. In order to save Russia's face, all of the threats mentioned above could have been made privately before moving openly to implement them if the threat failed.

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Zinner

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with "teeth" in it, warning or threatening the Soviet Union, would have been a miracle. Finally, on November 4, when overt aggression by the U.S.S.R. became a matter of record, the General Assembly did in fact move with remarkable alacrity in passing a fairly strongly worded resolution. By this time, however, Soviet commitment to crush the Hungarian revolt by military force had passed a point of no return.

Two Possible Approaches

Two possible approaches, very divergent in character but in their own right both more extreme than either moral suasion or political pressure, might have proved effective, especially if tried early enough—preferably before November 1 or 2, when Soviet policy appeared to have crystallized under the impact of the complete victory of the Hungarian revolution, as ascertained by Anastas I. Mikoyan and Mikhail A. Suslov in Budapest the preceding day. One possibility would have been to offer the Soviet Union far-reaching concessions in the form of United States troop withdrawal in Europe in return for Soviet nonintervention in Hungary. The other would have consisted of serious and discreet diplomatic representation alerting the Soviet government to the grave risk it would run in facing certain United States military involvement in the event it interfered in the Hungarian revolt.

The offer of concessions of sufficient magnitude to induce the Soviet government to stay out of Hungary must be rejected as wholly disadvantageous to us. The threat of military involvement, of course, would have been undertaken in the hope that the Soviet leaders would back down. Such a threat, however, would have had to be accompanied by instantane-

ous deployment of our forces and a firm resolve to fight in the event that the Soviet government accepted the challenge. To bluff would have been the most disastrous contingency of all.

The question arises whether the United States was in a position to take military action. The answer, one fears, has to be in the negative. There was no evidence of psychological preparedness for such action. Nor was there any basis for such action in the fundamental premises guiding our policy. Despite occasional bluster, and perhaps conscious fostering of misunderstanding about Washington's intentions to "liberate" the Communist-dominated countries, the policy of the United States has been to avoid international conflict as much as possible. The concrete problems connected with actual liberation of the East European captive nations had never been faced. "Peaceful liberation," which accurately reflects the persistent mood of Washington, is a contradiction in terms. The Hungarian crisis merely exposed a long-existing fallacy in a dramatic way.

Aside from these fundamentals, there were other immediate circumstances that complicated the task of decision-making. The denouement of the revolt itself, the lack of rapid and accurate communications with Budapest permitting an assessment of the situation, the unfortunate coincidence of the Hungarian revolt with the Middle Eastern crisis, and, not least, the imminence of Presidential elections, as well as perhaps the illness of the Secretary of State during the first days of November, made for an extraordinarily complex situation.

All told, desirable as it would have been to help the Hungarians more, the range of practical alternatives was severely circumscribed. While self-congratulation at our behavior is hardly in order, the reluctant conclu-

sion one has to reach is that we did just about all that was within our means. Regrettably this was not enough to save Hungary. In order to do better in the future some basic assumptions of our policy would have to be thoroughly re-examined, and this sort of exercise is not easily undertaken on the spur of the moment in the midst of an acute crisis. Now, however, is the time for it.

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But once the Soviets realized that the United States and the UN would rest on purely verbal protests and resolutions without teeth, which would soon be forgotten, it was safe to proceed with the massacre.

The Key Dates

The need for drastic political action should have been apparent in Washington at least by November 1. Although new Soviet troops began moving into Hungary on October 30, the full authenticity and significance of these reports may not have been fully confirmed in Washington before November 1, or at least not until after the President's fireside chat of October 31 had been written. However, by November 1 the vast scale and deployment of the new Soviet invasion, followed by Premier Nagy's appeal to the UN, should have shattered these illusions. The three days when the United States and the UN could have taken such action were November 1, 2 and 3.

Nevertheless, November 4 was not the last deadline for effective political action. The U.S.S.R. did not wholly burn its bridges on November 4 any more than Hitler burned his bridges at the time of his invasion of the Rhineland. Therefore, vigorous United States and UN action after November 4 might still have been effective, provided face-saving formulas

combined with vigorous diplomatic, economic and propaganda action were offered on the one hand, or threat of action on the other.

The fact that the Suez war danger was largely eliminated by the armistice on November 6 and that the President was re-elected by a great majority that same day removed the two greatest obstacles to energetic

United States political action inside and outside the UN.

Finally, it would have been better for the unity of the American people, the morale of the Western world and the prestige of the UN if the United States had proposed economic and diplomatic sanctions to end Soviet intervention in Hungary. This is true whether or not the UN majority

voted for them and whether or not, if voted, they would have proved effective. It would have been better to try and fail than not to try, because public opinion in the United States and Western Europe favored political action and resented the double standard of the United States and UN response to aggression in Suez compared to aggression in Hungary.



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

The Power of Nuclear Thinking

Few could foresee, when the atomic bomb was being first tested in the New Mexico desert nearly 12 years ago, that this invention, like a new Frankenstein, would come to dominate the existence of its creators and users. Yet the most striking aspect of world affairs today is the extent to which nuclear thinking determines the foreign policies of nations—both those which have the resources to produce the new “unconventional” weapons and those which do not: both the nuclear “haves” and the nuclear “have-nots.”

In its history-making White Paper on defense, Britain bluntly expressed two beliefs: that it could no longer afford to maintain both conventional and unconventional armaments, and that there is at present no defense against nuclear weapons. True, the British linked their defense-policy decision with the news that the United States would supply Britain, in a few years, with atomic missiles. And the Macmillan government rejected Japan's pleas for abandonment of the first British hydrogen bomb test on Christmas Island, in the Pacific, scheduled before August 1.

Britain's move has already caused repercussions of seismic proportions in Europe as well as in other parts of the globe. Washington's pledge to

strengthen Western European defenses by supplying nuclear missiles to its NATO allies produced not relief or enthusiasm but apprehension. The prospect that a future war will be waged primarily with nuclear rather than conventional weapons creates dismay among Europeans, who see themselves as the first victims of a new form of pitiless warfare—and warfare which many of them regard as immoral because of its horrifying potential for total destruction.

Europe's Anxiety

The results of this rapidly increasing revulsion are visible on many sides. In West Germany the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, which, following London's lead, had talked about substituting nuclear arms for manpower resources, was startled on April 12 when 18 German physicists, 4 of them Nobel prize winners, declared that they opposed the use of such arms by their country and would do nothing to develop nuclear weapons. Since Dr. Adenauer's political opponents, the Social Democrats, had already proclaimed their opposition to the use of nuclear missiles by West Germany, this issue is expected to play an important role in West Germany's gen-

eral elections of September 15, 1957. In an attempt to allay public concern, Dr. Adenauer's government made known that it would urge the great powers to cease nuclear tests.

Japan's Pleas

In Britain, too, the demand for suspension of tests has been given new momentum by a report of the Atomic Scientists' Association which expresses anxiety about the effects of nuclear explosions on human beings. The report states that as a result of the hydrogen bombs exploded so far, 50,000 people now living are likely to develop cancer from the strontium entering their bones, and that the effect will be even more dangerous in the case of children, who absorb a greater amount of strontium.

These pessimistic predictions are reminiscent of statements made last autumn by the defeated Democratic Presidential candidate Adlai E. Stevenson and backed by a number of American scientists. Administration spokesmen, however, do not believe that radioactivity has reached dangerous proportions. In Britain the atomic scientists' report has strengthened opposition to nuclear tests which produce radioactive fallout of as yet undetermined malignancy.

Meanwhile Japan, on which the

United States relies for defense against Russia in Asia, as it relies on West Germany for defense against Russia in Europe, has been vigorously pressing for abandonment of nuclear tests by all the great powers and has expressed grave concern about the contamination of food said to result from a series of Russian nuclear explosions, presumably in Siberia or Central Asia. Dr. Masatoshi Matsu-shita, president of St. Paul's University in Tokyo, a Christian institution, and personal envoy of Japanese Premier Nobusuke Kishi, had a widely publicized audience with Pope Pius XII on April 14 and called on Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on April 22; while in Moscow Japanese Ambassador Suemitsu Kadowaki urged the U.S.S.R. to halt further testing of nuclear weapons.

The three great powers now capable of manufacturing A- and H-bombs and atomic missiles—the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain—have each taken the position thus far that they could not abandon these tests unilaterally without falling behind the other powers in the development of nuclear armaments. Russia's Communist party chief Nikita S. Khrushchev was reported to have chided the Japanese for advocating a ban on tests and then failing to support the Soviet resolution favoring such a ban introduced at the 11th session of the United Nations Gen-

eral Assembly. While Tokyo has addressed its pleas to all of the Big Three, the fact that the atomic bomb was first used by a Western power against a non-Western nation has made Japan, with its memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, particularly insistent on a gesture of nuclear relinquishment by the United States.

Disarmament Hopes

Since not one of the great powers is prepared to give up tests without assurances of comparable action from its opponents, attention is once more focused on the possibility of a four-power agreement at the London disarmament conference, on which Harold E. Stassen, United States disarmament expert, reported to President Eisenhower on April 23. Mr. Stassen believes that the London talks are "the most serious" held with the Soviet Union on disarmament in the past 11 years. So far, the Western nations have sought to limit armaments, including nuclear weapons, but have been unable to find any foolproof system of inspection to insure enforcement of any agreement reached which would be acceptable to Moscow. Now in Europe there is a growing belief that no such system is needed, since all tests are said to be immediately detected by both sides.

In short, the more people everywhere think about the impact of nuclear missiles and the dangers of fall-

out, the more they are inclined to turn away from the possibility of having to participate in nuclear warfare. Only yesterday atomic and hydrogen bombs were regarded as a deterrent to war through the threat of "massive retaliation." Today this threat encourages the spread of neutralism—all the way from Britain and Germany in the West to Japan in the Far East. This shift in world opinion could turn out to be an advantage for the U.S.S.R.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Newsletter

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it join in the new missile-age strategy, is proof that events are not to Moscow's liking. But whereas in the first postwar decade there may have been a choice for the Western nations as to whether they would hang together or hang separately, atomic weapons and missile development have now ruled out such a choice. Hereafter they hang together—or they hang collectively. And their replies to Moscow indicate that they know this.

NEAL STANFORD

An Encyclopedia of Latin-American History, by Michael Rheta Martin and Gabriel H. Lovett (New York and London, Abelard-Schuman, 1956, \$6.00), describes the history of all the countries in this area and their relations with other nations, in an alphabetical arrangement. A preface explains the best way to use this reference book in order to get the most benefit from it.

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